CIRCLE OF TIME
SUMMARY
The meaning and purpose of human life given by the Society will end when its
Aim is achieved. However, if we now make the right choice for a meaning and
purpose for our future immortal existence, we will give ourselves some hope for
the infinite survival of all humanity, even if we fail to achieve the Aim of the
Society. This Essay concludes by describing how that residual hope for the
survival of humanity in extremis might best be fostered and preserved.
The Treatise on Morality notes that, when the Society of HumanKind achieves its
Aim, the meaning and purpose for our existence that was gained by our acceptance
of the Axioms and choice of the Dogma will be lost. It is possible to
imagine humanity existing without a purpose. It may be that when we reach the
new beginning our liberation from death will bring we will no longer be
interested in the meaning of our lives. It is highly unlikely however, that
we will be content to exist in our new-found new immortal epoch without choosing some
purpose or objective for ourselves.
One possibility is that we will embark on an attempt to create a new form
of self-conscious life, as a natural extension of gaining immortality for
ourselves. That is not to suggest that there is any necessary or logical connection
between our transformation into immortals and that kind of creative impulse. But it
is reasonable to suppose that, with the prospect of an infinite life before us,
we would want to apply some measure of how interesting the available alternatives
are likely to be, and to prefer long rather then short-term projects.
Using those criteria, what could be more fascinating and endlessly absorbing
than to try to create a self-conscious life form, preferably something with a
degree of adaptability, and then to set it free to develop as it wills. The
trick will be to create an organism which would have sufficient adaptability to
have the potential for infinite survival, and then to set it up so that it had
a real chance of achieving that objective. Or not, of course. A certainty
of success or a predictable development would be very tedious and hardly worth
the bother, other than as a preliminary stage in the creation of a truly
independent entity.
These otherwise idle and incoherent speculations about what our immortal
successors might, or might not, decide to do with their new-found freedom from
the prison of oblivion open some interesting prospects. They must
surely raise the possibility that we ourselves are merely the product of some
project giving meaning and purpose to the existence of some already existing
immortal inhabitants of the universe. Such beings could have found some
reason to create us and put us on our remote world, thus becoming the kind of
power or entitity that some readers might find to be an uncomfortably close fit
with the very God or gods of our earlier beliefs.
Whether they be the gods of our childhood or not, if we allow that such
infinitely superior immortal beings might exist in our universe, we cannot then
say what their attributes might be. We can reasonably suppose that their
characteristics are likely to be far outside the range of our experience. We
cannot therefore, ignore the possibility that, unlike ourselves, such beings might
be a species that has never been constrained by time. It then becomes conceivable
that our imaginary beings, far from being our creators, might simply have stumbled
on us in their timeless exploration of the universe, rather than having any
responsibility for our creation. In which case, their presence in our lives
will not contradict the proposition of the Axioms that we are the products of chance.
Equally, it is possible that such beings or entities do, indeed, exist
in our universe, but have not yet found us. Again, no contradiction of the
Axioms results, and since these beings are not necessarily subject to the
oblivion of death that restricts us, they could discover us even after we had come to
the end of our existence and disappeared, perhaps by destroying ourselves.
A halt to these highly attenuated speculations will now be called since
they are in grave danger of drifting into realms of pure fantasy. But this
otherwise fanciful line of thought does have some value in the context of
this Essay. It can at least serve the function of bringing a morsel of
comfort to us in our uncertain and unending struggle to find solutions to
the problems of our survival. The speculations of this Essay raise the hope
that even if we are truly alone and are masters of our own fate, and that we do
fail in our efforts to preserve ourselves, (which is the worst possible case to
be considered here) we may still be saved from oblivion. All that is
necessary is that some other entity or species in our universe does possess or
achieve the Objective we have failed to reach, and then finds some reason to
save us, perhaps from our own folly.
But beyond that residual hope for salvation in the worst possible circumstances
that may face us in our pursuit of our Aim, further speculation along these
lines becomes valueless, potentially harmful, and cannot be allowed. The risk is that
ideas can arise of circles of existence beyond even that of our neighbours,
creators or rescuers, and consequent speculations about their origins. That must open
a dangerous and destructive door to a possibility of a regress into circles
within circles to an infinite degreee and in infinite dimensions, taking us into
a fruitless search for certainty where none can be found
More importantly, such flights of fancy might adversely affect the
determination of the Society to pursue its Aim whole-heartedly. It is of the
utmost importance that all adherents of the Society should conduct their lives
on the basis of the Principles; on a wholehearted acceptance of the Axioms,
and on an unreserved commitment to the Objective of the Dogma. Otherwise the full
impact of those decisions on our moral and social life will be lost, and our
chances of achieving the Aim of the Society correspondingly reduced. So while
this part of this Essay may perhaps provide some ground for hope to sustain us
and give us the courage to take action in our darkest moments, it must never be
allowed to distract us from our determination to achieve the Aim of the Society
unaided.
However, given that sobering and wholesome constraint, it is possible to use
the speculations of this Essay to develop a tenable view of what should be the purpose
giving meaning to the existence of our species after our liberation from death -
which, the reader will remember, is where this Essay began. In short, the earlier
speculations suggest that it might be possible during our mortal
lives, to settle on a purpose for our immortal era that might preserve the
final faint refuge of hope for our species described in this Essay; that is, that
a presently unknown but timeless and/or deathless life-form or entity in our
universe might be willing to save us even where we have failed in effort to achieve
our Aim, and have consequently disappeared from the universe.
Clearly, if we are to gain that eminently desirable prize and expect our
presently unknown neighbours to come to our rescue
in extremis
we must give
them some reason to do so. And we must set about that process now, well in
advance of our having any need of recue from a total and final extinction. Because even
if such other beings are indeed capable of being our creators or rescuers, why should they
be concerned to save us from our fate? Why should they, or any of our
neighbours, feel any responsibility toward us if we fail to save ourselves from
our own folly or failure? It has to be said that our history and past conduct
have hardly made us attractive or desirable to other residents of the
universe. Indeed, we have probably been, and remain, so aggressive, noisy, childish
and destructive that any outsider sufficiently close by to have become aware of
our presence might well be considerably relieved (or whatever their equivalent
emotion might be) to find that we had managed to do away with ourselves completely.
If therefore, we wish to make our neighbours or creators feel any obligation to
save us from the worst that can befall us we will need to make some effort to
correct the bad impression we have almost certainly already made on our fellow
beings, and convince them that we are worth saving. We ought to begin perhaps,
to try to become better and more acceptable citizens of our universe. We
could make a useful start in that direction by setting out to demonstrate that
we are a species that recognises and advocates a brotherhood of all life-forms.
We might also try to minimise the possibility of our appearing to be a danger to others.
We could also make it clear, in all our future actions and patterns of
behaviour, that we will be content with what we have, and that we are willing to live at
peace within our present environment and its resources. That posture should not
however, preclude us from taking appropriate and prudent action to provide for our
infinite needs and security. There is no necessary conflict between a policy of peaceful
co-existence with our neighbours and our laying claim to any unused resources which
may be available in such unoccupied parts of our own solar system and its galaxy as
are properly and equitably essential to our survival, and which are within our reach.
There may even be an immediate benefit of that change in attitude and pattern
of behaviour, if it is coupled with an adoption of the benign image of
ourselves which this Essay suggests. It may save us from a threat to our
extinction of which we are not yet aware. That danger arises from the
possibility of some other species or entity detecting us and, seeing no
sign among us of any recognition of a fundamental brotherhood of the
life-forms of our universe, coming to the conclusion that it would be best
to eliminate us before we become a threat.
Having taken that first precautionary step and established a peaceful and
non-threatening outward stance toward others in our universe, we may then begin
the next stage of the process of convincing others that we are worth saving from
ourselves. We should embark on an attempt to create a moral climate in which
our neighbours or creators recognise and accept an obligation to rescue us from
the oblivion that will follow our failure to achieve the Objective of the Dogma,
if that is to be our fate. We can of course, have no certainty that our concept
of a moral obligation has any meaning to other species or entities. But we can hope that
any beings sufficiently developed to be aware of our presence will at least be
able to interpret our intentions correctly.
Given that reasonable hope we can perhaps best foster the moral obligation which we would
like to establish among our neighbours, by ourselves making a highly visible commitment to
provide that ultimate rescue service to others who might need it, if it is they, rather
than we, who find themseves in need of that ultimate refuge from oblivion. Clearly
however, and as was mentioned earlier, we must be prepared to lay that foundation of mutual
obligation well in advance of any danger of our having any need for such a service; if, that is,
we are to be effective in drawing our neighbours into feeling obliged to come to our support.
Drawing then, all the threads of this Essay together, its proposal is that we
should abandon our present childish and irresponsible patterns of behaviour, and
reject any plan merely to amuse ourselves in the new epoch of our existence
that will follow from the achievement of the Aim of the Society. We should
now determine that, following our own translation into immortals, we will then
search for and rescue any life-form in our universe which is in need
of the gift of immortality. As has been indicated, our present and continued
commitment to that cause may serve us well in providing some reason for our
hypothetical neighbours to feel a sense of unity with us, based on a common
ground of an aspiration to achieve immortality. That is a unanimity which
will be of inestimable value to us if it is we who have the misfortune to need
to be rescued from the oblivion of death.
But while that may be a powerful argument and a sound moral case for now making a
commitment to the salvation of all life-forms in our universe as the purpose of
our lives in our immortal epoch, it is not the sole justification for the suggestion.
There will be additional advantages in our adopting it, and particularly for
our effort to achieve the Objective of the Dogma.
In the first place, that commitment to the salvation of other life forms and to
a peaceful coexistence with our neighbours might encourage them to make
peaceful contact with us. Great profit can be gained by any such friendly
contact, particularly since it will enable us to develop a better understanding of
ourselves. Are we really an 'aggressive' species? To what extent are we
well equipped in terms of senses to understand our universe? What are our
limitations? Such questions may never finally be answered, but our chances of
gaining some useful insight into them will almost certainly be improved by any
opportunity we may have to examine and study the attributes and characteristics of
other viable life forms. In addition, our joining with others in our universe
will add a wholly new dimension to the range of skills, abilities and qualities
available to us to face the presently unimaginable hazards and chances of our
existence, both in our present circumstances and in the unprecedented environment
of our immortal epoch.
Taken together that must surely be as good a set of reasons as can be imagined
for adopting what might otherwise seem to be a somewhat loftily altruistic attitude
toward our, as yet unknown, neighbours, as well as laying a foundation for a common
purpose with all other life forms. As so often happens when we start from the
Axioms and Dogma, we end by discovering a concordance between our best interests
and those of others. In this case a unity which parallels and transcends our
common commitment to the pursuit of the Objective of the Dogma, to forge a link
with all the inhabitants of our universe.
One final point. The reader will not have failed to notice that these
speculations can also be seen as one possible justification for the attitude of
tolerance toward religious beliefs set out in the Treatise with that title.
If it does nothing else, this Essay must surely reinforce the uncertain stance
of that earlier discussion, and admit the possibility that, in the fullness of
our knowledge, the advocates of such beliefs may yet prove to have been right
in ways neither we, nor they, can, or could, anticipate.
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