THE FAMILY
SUMMARY
The founding ideas of the Society throw new light and perspective on the
institution of the family. It is concluded that a variety of forms of family
life should be accepted and supported by the Society provided they do not
conflict with, or detract from, pursuit of its Aim.
There is no necessary or logical connection between an acceptance of the Axioms
and choice of the Dogma as the foundation for our moral and social lives, and
the family as the basic unit of human society. The Axioms of the Society of
HumanKind give no reason or justification for the existence of our species, let
alone any of our social relationships. This consequence of the Axioms is
encapsulated in the Principle of Unity; is examined in the Treatise on the
Individual; and is further explored in this second founding book of the
Society, in
the Essay on Equality. In all those places it is recognised that the Axioms
are entirely neutral in these matters. They propose that neither our
existence nor any aspect of our social organisation has any inherent reason or
purpose. They say that if we had never emerged on our planet nothing in the
universe would compel our presence, or any particular form of human society.
We cannot derive the necessity for any of our social structures or
relationships from the Axioms. Yet our species seem always to have had some
kind of family unit as the building block of its society. The Society of
HumanKind cannot ignore that simple observation. It creates a requirement
that the
Society should deal with the question of the status of the family as a human
institution. The preceding discussion shows however, that the Society cannot
begin with any assumption that family life is in some way inherent in our
species, or a necessary feature of our social life.
The view of the Society on the institution of the family begins from that
statement. No need or requirement for our species to live in that kind of
relationship can be derived from the Axioms. However, the Society is not
based solely on the Axioms. It uses Axiomatic freedom to choose the Dogma as
the purpose of its existence, and then translates that choice into the Duty of
the Society to pursue its Aim. With that perspective it is possible for the
Society to see and approve of the family as a social unit that helps to
discharge its Responsibility by providing a safe and secure environment for
dependent children, and a locus in which new members of our society may learn
to live by the Principles. The Society can therefore see the family as a
source of nurture and development in children; one that ensures their growth
into individuals capable of maintaining stable and peaceful social
relationships and who are prepared to take their full and responsible part in
our unity, peace and progress.
It is here, in the universal existence of the family unit in human society
noted earlier in this Essay, and in the possibility that family life may make a
significant contribution to the peace and survival of the human species, that
the Society should look for grounds to justify any support it might wish to
give to that pattern of human relationships. When it examines the family from
that perspective the Society will find that the invariable pattern of behaviour
of our species in adopting stable family structures is not an indication of an
inherent behaviour pattern. It is the product of millennia of experience in
human co-operative existence. The outcome of that experience is an almost
universal recognition amongst humanity that such relationships are vital to the
survival of human children and a prerequisite for the peace and stability of
society. Certainly any loosening of familial ties is commonly associated with
a weakening of our social order and unity.
The Society can therefore, properly lend its support to the institution of
family life on the basis that it appears to have a long and honourable record
as a firm foundation for an orderly, peaceful and stable society. In this
respect the views of the Society on the family will be essentially pragmatic
and practical, looking to our history to provide evidence that the institution
is a proven way of binding our communities together that, at the same time,
provides a tried and tested means of transforming unformed infants into
competent and useful members of human society.
While the family continues to be seen by the Society as being effective in
providing those services there is no reason why that form of social
relationship should not be actively advocated and encouraged. There ought
however, to be a continuing internal debate about the application of the
Principles to family life, and especially on the question of which form of the
institution most efficiently enables the Society to discharge its Duty. As
the reader will no doubt have already anticipated from the general tenor of
this Essay, the conclusions reached by the Society and its adherents on such
issues will vary with both time and circumstances. But in every period of our
history a variety of forms and structures for the family will exist and will be
endorsed by the Society of HumanKind as meeting, to a greater or lesser extent,
the requirements of the Principles. In particular, the effect of the
Principle of Progress on those deliberations will prevent the Society from
adopting any view which might be seen as discouraging diversity and flexibility
in this institution of our social life.
Which leaves very little scope to say much more on the subject at this stage of
the development of the Society of HumanKind. An analysis of the family as an
institution from the point of view of the Axioms and Dogma draws attention to
the importance of the contribution made by the family to the adoption and
reinforcement of the Principles of Peace and Progress in our social life.
That is a criterion by which the Society may decide whether or not to support
or advocate all or any of the many forms of family life to be found in our
communities. In sum, in so far as the Society is concerned, it is not the
form of the institution of the family that is significant. It is its effect.
At the same time nothing in this Essay touches on conclusions which may be
drawn from other fields of human knowledge about the fundamental
characteristics of our species. In particular, the consequences of our dual
male/female reproductive system with its outcome of a helplessly dependent
new-born infant remain highly significant to our social organisation. These
presently remain immutable attributes of humanity, and while they persist they
impose a limitation on the degree of freedom of choice we have in these
matters. They make a set of stable social relationships, similar, but not
necessarily identical, to that provided by the traditional family, essential to
the survival of each individual as well as to the perpetuation of our species.
It surely cannot be denied that the family has provided those vital
relationships throughout our history, and that it was an indispensable factor
in ensuring our survival and development in our earliest generations when many
of our more fundamental characteristics were being formed.
Recognition of the traditional importance of the role of the family in the
protection of the outcome of our sexual behaviour, as part of its
responsibility for the regulation and mitigation of the potential for tension
and social conflict which arises from our sexual impulses, leads to a wider
conclusion for the Society on this issue. Wherever this form of social
relationship exists, its norms and rules can never be wholly divorced from
those pertaining to our sexuality.
Specifically, in considering its Duty, the
Society of HumanKind will hold that any form of the family that humanity may
adopt should undertake responsibilities extending beyond simple protection and
nurture of children. It should, for example, also always make a continuing
contribution to the infinite survival of our species. For that reason the
Society will require that any form of family should take responsibility, not
only for fostering and encouraging good citizenship, but also for inculcating
reproductive heterosexuality in both its adult and its immature members. In
the view of the Society that is a function that should rank equally with the
other, similar, social duties which have been almost exclusively the province
of the traditional family unit.
Little or nothing else of value or moment can properly be said about the status
of the family in the era of the Society of HumanKind. This Essay points to
the importance of the unit as a potential contributor to the wider purposes of
the Society and in particular to the achievement of its Aim. The role which
emerges from that analysis of this old institution of our social life is
familiar. Any variety of the family the Society may chose to support should,
in its form and function, display and personify a commitment to the survival
and commonalty of humanity by and through a structure of mutual care and
support of children, and be built around a core value, but not necessarily
practice, of stable heterosexualiy. That surely, is the minimum requirement
for its acceptance and approval in the era of the Society of HumanKind.
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